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Introduction
The problem of corruption among political leaders, 
government officials and even some traditional 
leaders is popularly considered to be widespread in 
Vanuatu.1 Indeed, former prime minister Natuman 
observed in November 2014 (Makin 21/11/2014) 
that: ‘There are too many allegations of corruption 
such that it has become commonplace.’ Yet the 
research conducted for this paper suggests that the 
higher levels of the Vanuatu judiciary have, by and 
large, managed to create and uphold a reputation for 
impartiality and incorruptibility, and are respected 
by the other organs of government and the legal 
fraternity. This is exemplified by occasions such as a 
2013 decision of the Supreme Court on the legality 
of a motion of no confidence in the government 
brought by the opposition. The Chief Justice 
finished writing his judgment in the early hours 
of the morning and went to the court house to 
hand it down. He read out his decision to a packed 
audience, clearly spelling out his reasons in both 
English and the local Melanesian pidgin (Bislama). 
The decision had fundamental repercussions for 
the continuation of the government’s term in office, 
meaning the stakes were high and the potential 
for conflict clearly present. Yet, at the end of the 
reading of the judgment, the members of the crowd 
both inside and outside the courtroom turned to 
one another, shook hands, and slowly dispersed. 
This illustrates widespread recognition of the court’s 
legitimacy as a final arbiter and check on executive 
and legislative power.
In marked contrast, the position of the court is 
far more tenuous in a number of other countries 
in the region. For instance, in Papua New Guinea 
in 2011 the government refused to recognise the 
authority of a Supreme Court decision, resulting 
in two governments reigning for seven months 
(Re Reference to Constitution section 19(1) by East 
Sepik Provincial Executive (ESP Case) [2011] PGSC 
41 (12 December 2011), [9]). Further, in 2014 the 
government of Nauru deported the Chief Justice 
and magistrate. The current level of independence 
in Vanuatu is also under considerable scrutiny at 
the time of writing, with the headline of the daily 
newspaper on 16 June 2015 stating ‘Opposition 
Fears Gov’t Will Interfere in Judiciary’ (Binihi 
16/6/2015:1), making this a timely moment to 
consider the factors that have led to the current 
levels of confidence in the judiciary in Vanuatu 
today. This paper has a particular focus on the 
informal networks that have a significant, although 
often overlooked, impact on the judiciary’s 
independence.
This paper is intended to fill a gap in the 
literature concerning the Vanuatu judiciary, as this 
topic is rarely addressed other than in reports by 
international non-government organisations, such 
as Transparency International and its local chapter, 
Transparency International (Vanuatu), or bilateral 
donors and multilateral organisations engaged in 
law and justice work (which is often unpublished). 
The paper also identifies potential sources of 
influence that threaten judicial independence, and 
reflects upon what insights Vanuatu’s experiences 
may provide into the influence of informal 
networks on judicial independence more broadly. 
The paper also raises a number of unanswered 
questions relating to broader questions about the 
sources of respect for the judiciary in Vanuatu and 
the role of culture in relation to this respect.
Judicial independence has numerous important 
ramifications for Vanuatu. It is crucial in terms 
of democratic accountability, 
maintaining the rule of law and in 
keeping the country together in 
the face of considerable political 
instability.2 This is most recently 
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exemplified by the situation in June 2015 whereby 
the courts are required to adjudicate on a bribery 
case against 19 members of parliament, all on the 
government side, and including seven members of 
Cabinet (Makin 13/6/2015), as well as the legality 
of the dissolution of parliament by the Speaker that 
prevented the hearing of a motion of no confidence 
against the current government. From a broader 
political perspective, it is particularly relevant 
that Vanuatu is a young nation. The court is often 
required to decide fundamental constitutional 
issues, making its independence essential to 
the establishment of the legal foundation of the 
state. Given the relative underdevelopment of 
civil society and the media, the courts are the 
prime mechanism to hold political authorities 
accountable, and their independence is essential to 
their ability to do so. For example, the courts have 
presided over numerous reviews of parliamentary 
processes, including the pre-emptive closure of 
parliament (Republic v Carcasses [2009] VUCA 
46), motions of no confidence (see, for example, 
Vanuaroroa v Republic of Vanuatu [2013] VUSC 
102; Natapei v Wells [2013] VUSC 43), and very 
recently, a motion to suspend 16 members of 
parliament (Carcasses v Boedoro [2014] VUSC 155; 
Boedoro v Carcasses [2015] VUCA 2).3 This role is 
expressed by the Chief Justice as follows:
Vanuatu continues to grow its constitutional 
and democratic foundations and 
developments. The judicial pronouncements 
contribute to this process of constitutional 
growth under the supremacy of the rule of 
law. It must be encouraged and sustained. 
(Vanuaroroa v Republic of Vanuatu [2013] 
VUSC 102)
From an economic perspective, judicial 
independence is critical to the maintenance 
of good governance and a strong legal system, 
which is essential to positive development and the 
country’s ability to attract investors. For instance, 
in the context of interviews discussed below, one 
leading local lawyer stated that the assurance they 
will be able to get a fair hearing before the courts 
is a factor that he stresses to investors considering 
investing in Vanuatu.
Vanuatu and Its Legal System
Vanuatu is an archipelagic country in the south-east 
Pacific Ocean, with a population of approximately 
250,000 people dispersed over 64 of its 83 islands 
and speaking over 100 different languages. Only 
six islands have populations of more than 10,000 
people, making the reach of the state extremely 
limited outside the two main urban centres of Port 
Vila and Luganville and the various provincial 
headquarters. As a result, many populations rely 
heavily on customary forms of dispute resolution 
and governance by the local chiefly system.4 
Customary dispute resolution varies enormously in 
form throughout the archipelago, but can be said 
to involve community-based decision-making in 
which local leaders mediate between the parties 
and arrive at a resolution that takes the interests of 
the community as a whole into account, as well as 
those of the parties directly concerned. Resolutions 
often involve the payment of fines of money, food 
and prestige items to different parties involved, 
formal apologies, and a ceremony in which the 
parties drink kava and eat together.5 Vanuatu 
achieved independence from its joint colonial 
powers, France and England, in 1980. Today it 
follows a Westminster-type parliamentary system 
with a constitution as the supreme law, setting out 
the separation of powers between the Executive, 
Legislature and the Judiciary.6
The Vanuatu judiciary is composed of four 
levels: the Court of Appeal, constituted by judges 
from Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific 
islands countries as well as the Vanuatu Supreme 
Court justices; the Supreme Court, with seven 
judges, three ni-Vanuatu, one from New Zealand, 
one from Fiji, one from Africa who is also the 
first female Supreme Court judge, and one from 
the United Kingdom, all of whom are based 
in Port Vila;7 the Magistrates Court, with five 
magistrates in Port Vila, the capital, and four on 
three other islands;8 and the Island Courts, which 
are established under the Island Courts Act 1983, 
and today operate on 11 of the larger and more 
populated islands and partly operate on two 
others (Evans et al. 2010:8). Island Courts have 
limited jurisdiction, as set out in their warrants of 
establishment, and are presided over by lay justices 
who are knowledgeable in custom (see Jowitt 1999).
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The research for this paper is largely based 
upon semi-structured qualitative interviews 
conducted in Vanuatu in October 2014. Most 
informants were members of the legal profession, 
but also included a journalist, members of 
Transparency International (Vanuatu), and local 
legal academics.9 Transparency International also 
released a National Integrity System Assessment 
in 2014 (Jowitt 2014),10 which was an excellent 
source of reference. In 2013 Transparency 
International (Vanuatu) also produced a Vanuatu 
Judicial Monitoring System Research Report that 
provided important input (Transparency Vanuatu 
2013). Finally, relevant case law was identified 
through searches of the online repository, PacLII 
(PacLII n.d.).
There are important limitations on the research 
that was done for this paper: the lowest level of 
the court system, the Island Courts, were not 
interviewed, nor were the magistrates currently 
residing outside the main township of Port Vila. 
The research also lacks input from the general 
public, which would have added another dimension 
to the perspectives being expressed by those within 
the legal profession. In partial compensation, this 
author has previously worked for a year in the 
Vanuatu Public Prosecutor’s office and had taught 
at the University of South Pacific Law School in 
Port Vila, Vanuatu, for eight years. This research 
is consequently also informed by a myriad of 
informal sources in casual conversations both over 
the two weeks of fieldwork and in the previous 
nine years in-country. Due to these limitations, this 
paper is largely limited to the Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeal. It is also relevant that the legal 
profession in general is trained to be deferential to 
the judiciary, and this may be a factor influencing 
their impressions.
1. How Independent is the Judiciary in Vanuatu 
Today?
Before discussing the factors that contribute to, 
and threaten, judicial independence in Vanuatu, 
or confidence in the judiciary more broadly, it 
is useful to first set out the evidence about the 
degree of independence the judiciary in Vanuatu 
currently holds. Independence is taken in this 
discussion to mean freedom from undue influence 
of all sorts, including economic, political, religious, 
and customary or cultural. The focus here is on the 
actual independence of individual members of the 
judiciary, as opposed to the institutional structure 
within which the judiciary is positioned that limits 
or supports this independence, such as processes for 
appointing and removing judges and the funding of 
the judiciary.11 This approach originates from recent 
work on judiciaries that has shown that analysis of 
formal institutional roles and arrangements only 
tells part of the story (Helmke 2005; Kapiszewski 
2012; Popova 2012; Staton 2010). Attention is 
also needed as to how informal arrangements 
function to both support and undermine judicial 
independence.
It is, however, helpful to briefly outline these 
formal structures at the outset. The Chief Justice 
is appointed by the President of the Republic after 
consultation with the Prime Minister and the leader 
of the Opposition (Article 49(3) Constitution of the 
Republic of Vanuatu). Other judges are appointed 
by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial 
Services Commission which is composed of the 
Chief Justice, the minister responsible for Justice 
(who serves as the Chair), the Chairman of the 
Public Service Commission and a representative 
of the National Council of Chiefs.12 Judges have 
tenure until retirement and can only be dismissed 
in the event of conviction and sentence on a 
criminal charge or a finding by the Judicial Services 
Commission of an act of gross misconduct or on the 
grounds of incapacity or professional incompetence 
(ibid.). Judges do not fall under the Ombudsman 
Act 1998, nor under the Leadership Code Act 1998. 
Prior to this year, there was no clear avenue for a 
member of the public to make a complaint about 
the judiciary. However, a new judicial complaints 
mechanism was developed in 2014. This establishes 
a procedure and a guide to handle complaints 
against judges and court staff. This was an initiative 
of the court itself, supported by the Pacific Judicial 
Development Programme, designed to ensure 
greater transparency around complaints, rather than 
something imposed from outside.13
The informants in this study were unanimously 
of the opinion that the Supreme Court is 
extremely independent. One Supreme Court judge 
commented that he has never even experienced 
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‘a whiff of an attempt to bribe’, and the officers at 
Transparency International (Vanuatu)’s Advocacy 
and Legal Advice Centre stated that they had 
not had any complaints about lack of judicial 
independence at any level of the courts.14 Not a 
single respondent expressed an opinion other 
than utter confidence in the judiciary, and there 
have been no official reports or complaints about 
lack of judicial independence for over a decade. 
Since the dismissal of the former Chief Justice in 
1996 as discussed below, there has not been any 
instance of the government dismissing a judge. 
Of course, assessing independence is difficult 
because an alternative explanation is that the 
lack of independence is extremely well covered 
up. However, this explanation is less convincing 
in the context of the small scale of Vanuatu and 
the thick social ties among its legal elite, which 
tends to mean that secrets are hard to keep. In 
addition, as the judiciary are relatively poorly 
paid, any unexpected increases in wealth or 
privilege are likely to be noticed. Since 1996 two 
judges and at least one magistrate have resigned 
following requests from the Chief Justice to ‘do 
the honourable thing’ after their involvement in 
conduct unbefitting their judicial role,15 but no 
judicial officer has been dismissed through political 
interference.
The vast majority of informants also expressed 
confidence in a high level of independence of the 
magistracy, although there were some concerns 
that corruption may be creeping in at this level. As 
discussed below, a contributing factor may be that 
the magistrates are no longer housed together with 
the judiciary following the tragic burning of the 
Vanuatu Court House in 2007.16
This finding of a high level of independence 
is confirmed by a number of recent relevant 
reports. Transparency International’s 2014 National 
Integrity Report (Jowitt 2014:15) found that ‘The 
judiciary is one of the strongest institutions of the 
Vanuatu National Integrity System … This study 
shows that it is largely independent, although it 
lacks some resources.’ Later, the report (ibid.:60) 
states that ‘Vanuatu’s judicial system is generally 
respected as being impartial, independent and fair, 
even though there are few legal mechanisms to 
ensure the integrity of judges.’17 In its 2013 report, 
Transparency International (Vanuatu) also found 
that there was not much evidence of corruption in 
the sense of misuse of position for personal gain, 
and no reports of judiciary or court staff accepting 
bribes. However, it did also state that there were 
‘some instances where conflicts of interest appeared 
to affect actions of police, prosecutors and judges’. 
One case was noted where there was a perception 
that a magistrate was unwilling to be involved in 
the prosecution of a political leader (Transparency 
Vanuatu 2013:7, 19). The Pacific Judicial 
Development Programme also reported in a 2012 
report that the Vanuatu judiciary is regarded highly 
— as ‘fair, independent and of integrity’ (Ehmann 
2012:3). The 2015 Index of Economic Freedom 
states that Vanuatu has a ‘largely independent 
judiciary’ (The Heritage Foundation 2015). 
Finally, in 2013 a small survey conducted among 
25 lawyers and legal office staff by Transparency 
International (Vanuatu) found that 21 of these 
staff were confident that the judiciary is impartial 
(Transparency Vanuatu 7/2/2014).
Confidence in these high levels of respect for 
judicial independence and fairness can also be 
taken from the equally high numbers of complaints 
that were made during the research conducted for 
this paper about delays in the judicial system, in 
particular regarding the writing of judgments. This 
tends to discount the possibility that no complaints 
were made about judicial independence because 
of fear or intimidation, because if this was the case 
then it is unlikely that the same informants would 
have been so outspoken about their frustration 
at cases of delay. On this subject, as noted below, 
there have been recent improvements. A further 
supporting factor is the reasonably low level of 
cases where bias and apprehended bias have been 
argued and established before the courts. While 
sporadic reporting of cases makes any quantitative 
analysis of case law difficult, a search of the PacLII 
database for cases of judicial bias since 1997 reveals 
that there have been 24 reported cases where bias 
has been alleged. In six of these cases reasonable 
apprehension of bias was found. Of these, 
12 involved island court justices (apprehended bias 
found in three cases), three involved magistrate 
justices (apprehended bias found in one case) and 
eight involved Supreme Court judges (apprehended 
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bias found in two cases: Matarave v Talivo [2010] 
VUCA 3; Avock v Government of the Republic of 
Vanuatu [2002] VUCA 44). The higher number 
of cases in the Supreme Court is likely to be 
attributable to the fact that higher court cases are 
far more consistently uploaded onto the PacLII 
database than for the lower courts.
This broad consensus about a high level of 
independence is, however, inconsistent with the 
findings of the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, 
which found that public perceptions of corruption 
within the judiciary are increasing (Transparency 
International n.d.). Some of the data presented in 
this report are troubling. For example, it reports 
that 9 per cent of respondents reported paying a 
bribe to the judiciary in the previous 12 months, 
and that 42 per cent considered the judiciary to be 
corrupt or extremely corrupt (ibid.). The research 
for the Global Corruption Barometer was done 
using computer-assisted telephone interviewing 
with 505 respondents by researchers located 
outside the country (Transparency International 
2013:27, 30). It may be that problems of translation 
or miscommunication are responsible for the 
discrepancies between those findings and the 
results of this study. It may also be that the 
perceptions of lack of independence by the general 
public are different to those held by members of 
the legal profession, who were the basis of the 
current research. This is also suggested by a street 
survey conducted by Transparency International 
(Vanuatu) in 2014 that found that only 22 per cent 
of the 50 respondents stated they were confident 
the judiciary was impartial (Vanuatu Daily Post 
24/2/2014). Although initially appearing to be 
inconsistent with the broad consensus about 
independence, further analysis of the findings 
suggests that a number of respondents included as 
‘lack of impartiality’ other reasons to distrust the 
courts. These included the nature of the introduced 
justice system as a whole (comments indicated 
that some people thought the system was only 
for the rich, or not for the average ni-Vanuatu), 
and delays in going to court and the issuing of 
judgments. Only six of those who responded 
negatively to the question of whether they were 
confident in the impartiality of the judiciary cited 
judicial bias (although not all who responded 
negatively provided explanations) (Transparency 
Vanuatu 7/2/2014). Further, the different levels of 
the judiciary were not distinguished between in 
the survey, which may further explain the findings. 
The fact that lawyers as officers of the court are 
less likely to be overtly critical of the courts than 
the general population is also another possible 
explanatory factor. This discrepancy should be 
further examined by conducting further research 
into the experiences of the general population about 
the judiciary, carefully distinguishing between 
different levels of judiciary. The new complaints 
mechanism may provide a useful initial repository 
of data for conducting such research.
2. The Independence of the Judiciary in Context
This section briefly contextualises the independence 
of the judiciary along three different axes: compared 
with other organs of government; compared with 
the court’s own previous history; and compared 
with other countries in the region.
The Integrity and Independence of Other Organs 
of Government
As mentioned above, Vanuatu currently experiences 
high levels of concerns about the corruption of 
political leaders,18 and many senior public servants. 
As one informant stated, ‘every other institution 
is so tarnished with manipulation’. This can be 
seen in the steady stream of ombudsman reports 
that reveal ongoing corruption by political leaders, 
particularly (until recently) regarding the leasing of 
land (McDonnell 2013). In its 2014 report (Jowitt 
2014:35), Transparency International (Vanuatu) 
found that ‘Public trust in members of parliament 
is low.’ There are also concerns about corruption 
in other parts of the justice system, in particular 
the office of the public prosecutor and the police 
(Radio New Zealand 17/5/2005).19 Finally, there 
is a growing concern in regard to the lack of 
independence by chiefs and chiefly institutions 
(Jowitt 2014:189–99), although it must be noted that 
independence per se is not a feature of Vanuatu’s 
customary dispute management system.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to go 
into detail about the levels of corruption in other 
institutions of government. The aim is just to 
make two points: the first is that corruption and 
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undue influence is a common problem in many 
aspects of Vanuatu’s governance (both state and 
non-state) today; the second is that informants 
frequently compared the independence and trust 
in the judiciary with trust in the other organs of 
government. For example, the Director General of 
Justice stated:
When you look at the pillars of governance in 
Vanuatu, traditional governance, parliament 
and the executive, all are corrupted. The only 
thing that holds the country together is the 
judiciary, it is the only thing that is respected 
now. Everyone runs to the courts — 
politicians, chiefs — when they have troubles 
they run to the court.20
This observation that the court is used regularly 
as a place to resolve differences by political leaders 
and community leaders (primarily in relation to 
disputes over chiefly title and land) was echoed 
by many other informants. This in turn raises the 
question of whether this is due to respect for the 
constitution, a view that the courts are the ultimate 
forum for dispute settlement, respect for judges’ 
individual mana, or something else.
The Independence of the Court in the Past
The Vanuatu judicial system has not always had 
such a high reputation for independence. Following 
independence, there have been two previous 
chief justices,21 both foreign, until the present 
ni-Vanuatu Chief Justice Vincent Lunabek. Former 
Chief Justice, Vaudin d’Imecourt, from Mauritius, 
served from 1992 to 1996. While there is limited 
material available on which to draw credible 
conclusions about his independence, a number of 
informants who were involved in the legal system 
at that time made the observation that he did not 
give confidence that he was entirely free from 
influence, especially in regard to political influence. 
There were also contemporary allegations made 
concerning this.22 There are also suggestions from 
the Court of Appeal at the time that he may have 
become too investigative and inappropriately 
stepped out of his role as independent arbiter (see 
Picchi v Public Prosecutor [1996] VUCA 9). In all 
events, political influence led to the deportation 
of Chief Justice d’Imecourt from the country in 
1996,23 an event that had a powerful impact upon 
the current Chief Justice as is discussed below. 
Again, the scope of this paper does not permit a 
detailed historical essay on the independence of 
the court during the decades prior to 1996. The 
main point is that when the current Chief Justice 
was appointed as Acting Chief Justice in 1996, it 
was not to a judiciary that was widely seen as being 
independent. On the contrary, it had just had its 
dependence on the executive most graphically 
demonstrated.
The Independence of the Courts in the Region
The final axis of comparison is in regard to other 
countries in the Pacific islands region. Again, a 
detailed consideration of this is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, while overt encroachments 
into judicial independence are not apparent in 
some countries in the region, such as Cook Islands, 
Solomon Islands and Samoa, in other countries 
there have recently been a number of incursions 
of political, economic and other influence. For 
example, in Nauru the Chief Justice was expelled 
from the country in 2014, and in 2007 Fiji’s Chief 
Justice was suspended following the coup that 
overthrew the Qarase Government.24 In 2011 the 
Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea was arrested on 
sedition charges (Blackwell 13/3/2012) and in 2014 
there was another set of disagreements between 
the PNG judiciary and the government. This led 
to the Prime Minister refusing to comply with an 
arrest warrant issued against him by the courts 
and him accusing the judiciary of being ‘politically 
compromised’ (News.com.au 17/6/2014).
3. What Factors Threaten Judicial Independence 
in Vanuatu?
The aim of this section is to set out the different 
factors that have the potential to undermine judicial 
independence, and some of which actually have 
undermined it in certain cases. The particular 
emphasis is on the role of informal networks 
that have a real or potential impact upon judicial 
independence.
Family/Islandism/Wantokism
The first potential factor to undermine 
independence is what is sometimes called 
wantokism (from the Bislama term wantok 
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meaning member of the same language group) 
and sometimes islandism. This is a common 
phenomenon found throughout Melanesia and 
involves a ‘kinship-derived system of obligation 
and support’ (Brigg 2009). In customary systems 
the chief ’s relationships with the members of his 
community are absolutely central to their claims 
to legitimacy and ability to mediate a satisfactory 
customary resolution to disputes. However, in 
the context of the state legal system, it is often 
seen as problematic in that it could lead judges 
or court staff to give preferential treatment to 
members of their own clan or tribe. There is a risk 
of a perception of wantokism whenever there is 
a significantly higher number of people from the 
same ples in the same workforce or institution. 
This is less of a factor for the Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeal as currently constituted than the 
lower courts at present, owing to the large number 
of expatriate judges on the bench as outlined in 
the introduction. A number of informants raised 
concerns over the possible influence of ‘islandism’ 
in the Magistrates Courts, but no actual instances 
were cited. In one reported decision, however, 
the Supreme Court appeared to accept a claim 
of bias on the basis that ‘the Magistrate knew the 
complainant well, had been to his house and had 
helped with his son’s brideprice’ (Reuben v Public 
Prosecutor [2003] VUCA 30).
There are often assumptions made by the 
parties to court cases that the wantok system will 
exert influence in the state judicial system, and for 
that reason judges and magistrates often recuse 
themselves from cases where this issue arises. 
However, given the small size of the judiciary, 
judges have to be careful with this mechanism and 
do not always use it where there are no concerns 
raised. For example, a magistrate commented that 
he has two new domestic violence cases a day, 
making it difficult to always ensure no family or 
clan connection. The Chief Registrar stated ‘we 
have developed to a stage where it is not important 
where a judge comes from’25 and confirmed that 
judges were regularly assigned to hear cases from 
their home island. However, it is likely that this will 
remain an area where robust debate will need to 
continue in order to ensure that perceptions of lack 
of judicial independence are adequately addressed. 
The appropriate balance between independence 
and wantokism also remains a very live issue in 
relation to island court judges, and those serving on 
custom area land tribunals,26 whose primary value 
lies in the fact that they are very much part of their 
community and are meant to perform a role that 
links customary justice with the state legal system.
The only (reported) attempt to unduly 
influence the Chief Justice, recounted by numerous 
informants, involved a politician from the Chief 
Justice’s home island of Malekula. The incident 
occurred in 2013 while the Chief Justice was on 
tour in Malekula, during the hearing of a case 
concerning a post-election assault. Just prior to 
the closing of the case, the politician involved 
approached the Chief Justice’s secretary to ask her to 
tell the Chief Justice that he wanted to have a shell 
of kava with him. The secretary reported the matter 
to the Chief Justice who had her swear an affidavit 
about the incident and he then summonsed the 
politician to court, gave him a very public lecture 
about the importance of judicial independence, 
made him apologise to the court, and alerted the 
media to the story.27 This incident demonstrates 
both the potential influence of wantokism, and also 
the use of public shaming to deter attempts made to 
influence judges on the basis of wantokism.
National Political Influence
The Vanuatu judiciary has managed to achieve 
considerable administrative independence from 
the government through the passage of the Judicial 
Services and Courts Act in 2003. Prior to this piece 
of legislation, the executive controlled the support 
staff in the courts as they were employed as public 
servants through the public service commission, 
and hence were accountable to the government 
and not the judiciary. The Chief Justice explains 
his dissatisfaction with the previous state of affairs 
as follows:
The fact that the courts were largely managed 
by the government, whose representatives are 
most frequently litigants before the courts, 
created a potential for interference. The Head 
of the Judiciary experienced anxiety about 
having to go to the government in order 
to remedy deficiencies in administrative 
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resources which impacted upon the 
operations of the court. (Lunabek 2010)
Today the judiciary manage and control 
their own staff and own budget. However, the 
government still votes on the overall court budget 
each year. In other words, there is no requirement 
that the courts be allocated a particular percentage 
of the annual general budget. As such, in the words 
of the Director General for Justice, the government 
still ‘holds them by the tail’.28 As mentioned above, 
there was one reported case where a politician 
attempted to organise a private meeting with the 
Chief Justice over a shell of kava, but this was the 
only incident mentioned in my research. Political 
influence was also only mentioned in one case of 
claimed bias that is reported, and this was found 
not to be substantiated by the Court of Appeal.29 
The 2013 report by Transparency International 
(Vanuatu) also discusses one case where a 
magistrate was allegedly apprehensive about taking 
on a case involving a politician (Jowitt 2014:17). In 
general, politicians are seen to respect the judiciary, 
as indicated by the frequency with which motions 
of no confidence, challenges to election results and 
other processes are brought before the courts for 
adjudication.30 Although there was one occasion 
in 2004 when the prime minister of the time used 
parliamentary privilege to make highly derogatory 
statements about the court and the Chief Justice in 
particular, this has not been repeated (see Vohor 
v Public Prosecutor [2004] VUCA 23). The only 
concerns raised by informants concerning political 
interference was that politicians seemed able to 
have their cases heard promptly, in contrast to 
other matters. This concern has been addressed by 
the Chief Justice himself on a number of occasions, 
explaining that it is important that disputes 
paralysing parliament or the government be dealt 
with quickly, for everyone’s sake.
A previous potential threat to political 
independence came from the fact that the current 
Chief Justice was appointed as an Acting Chief 
Justice, a position that had no guarantee of tenure, 
for a full six years. This left him in a precarious 
position when he was working to push through 
changes to court administration in the form of the 
Judicial Services and Courts Act, which involved 
robust negotiations with the government.
A final incident demonstrating the potential 
for interference from other organs of government 
occurred in 2010 when an expatriate New Zealand 
judge, Justice Dawson, was the subject of death 
threats from the Vanuatu Mobile Force, the 
country’s paramilitary force (Gould 6/4/2010). This 
followed the judge’s writing of a report following 
a coronial inquiry into the recapture and beating 
to death of an escaped prisoner by the police. 
This incident was dealt with by the provision of 
increased security for the judge and ultimately the 
judge stayed out his two-year term with no further 
incidents. However, the recommendations in his 
report have yet to be acted upon and there was no 
statement from the government condemning the 
threats. While this was a report and not a judgment, 
it could portend similar serious threats to judges if 
police or Vanuatu Mobile Force violence comes up 
as an issue in cases before them.
Economic Influence (Bribery)
The potential for economic influence comes 
from the relatively small salaries that judges earn, 
compared with the amounts that can be earned 
by lawyers in private practice.31 This point was 
commented upon by a number of informants and 
identified by the Director General of Justice as a 
major factor in the ongoing problems of filling 
judicial vacancies with suitable candidates. The only 
incident of alleged bribery reported in this study 
occurred in 1999 in a case involving Julian Moti, 
the former Attorney General of Solomon Islands, 
who was charged with sexual offences relating to 
an underage girl when he was resident in Vanuatu. 
The magistrate dismissed the case and was later 
claimed by the Australian Federal Police to have 
been acting corruptly, allegedly having had his law 
studies funded by Moti in exchange.32 As a result of 
these allegations, the magistrate later resigned, but 
no formal findings were ever made concerning the 
incident.
International Political Influence
Vanuatu is classified internationally as a Least 
Developed Country with a low GDP (gross 
domestic product) and limited exports and is 
therefore heavily reliant on international donor 
assistance. A potential source of undue influence 
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therefore comes from foreign governments, 
although there is no evidence of this to date. As 
one informant observed, ‘closeness to aid donors 
can have a negative impact on the community’s 
and politician’s ideas about the independence of 
the judiciary’. Such a risk is one that the judiciary 
has been extremely cognisant of under the 
leadership of the current Chief Justice. Seen from 
this perspective, the greatest potential threat in this 
regard is Australia, which is a major contributor 
to various legal sector strengthening programs. At 
the same time, many of the cases that ultimately 
find their way before the courts involve Australian 
interests, for example, those involving Australian 
investors attracted by Vanuatu’s tax haven status. 
There have been a number of occasions in the 
past when allegations of Australian interference 
have been made, although these have never been 
actually proven. In 2003 members of the Australian 
Federal Police were forced to leave Vanuatu after 
facing accusations of spying and interference in 
Vanuatu internal affairs (ABC News 10/5/2012); 
and in 2011 two Australian advisers in the State 
Law Office were deported following allegations 
they were ‘spying’ for the Australian Government 
(Thomas 25/5/2011).
To date, the Vanuatu judiciary have maintained 
an extremely independent stance in relation 
to Australian aid, refusing virtually all direct 
assistance, although important assistance is 
provided indirectly through the Pacific Judicial 
Development Programme as discussed below. 
Some informants suggested that this approach was 
too extreme and unnecessary, one calling it ‘reverse 
paranoia’. In the past year, however, there has been 
a significant turn around, with the court ‘opening 
the door’ to the Australian stretem rod blong jastis 
[smoothing the road towards justice] program 
(DFAT 2011). The reason given for this change 
in direction was that the court now considers 
that it has a sound system in place that ensures 
judicial independence.33 A contributing factor is 
likely to be the loss of the court house following 
the arson attack. The lack of suitable alternative 
accommodation provided by the government has 
meant that such assistance has become a necessity 
for the court to continue to function effectively.
Church Networks
Christianity is widespread in Vanuatu. It stands to 
reason that many judges and magistrates are deeply 
Christian and some are leaders in their church 
community. Judges and magistrates in Vanuatu 
belong to a variety of different churches, including 
Anglican, Baptist, Seventh-day Adventist and the 
Apostolic Church. As one judge observed, attending 
church is one of the sole social activities a judge can 
freely do, and another commented that the types 
of personalities that judges have also often draws 
them towards actively participating in church. It 
was also frequently commented that Christianity 
supports judicial independence as it contributes to 
moral thinking and belief in community service and 
selflessness. Other benefits of attending church and 
being a Christian for judges are said to be that it 
involves judges with the community, it allows them 
to talk in language the population understands, and 
it makes the population respect judges more when 
they are regularly seen attending church.
However, there are two potential negative 
impacts it may have on judicial independence. The 
first is in relation to potential and actual conflicts 
of interest when deciding cases involving members 
of their own congregation. In relation to this, one 
judge said that he tells his congregation that he is 
their pastor, but if they break the law then he will 
judge them according to the law. No examples of 
such cases were raised by any informants, but there 
is one reported judgment where the issue arose. In 
Matarave v Talivo [2010] VUCA 3, the applicants 
claimed that the Supreme Court’s decision in an 
appeal from the Island Court on an issue of land 
should be reviewed due to bias. The particular 
complaint was that the judge was a member of the 
same church as one of the parties, had attended 
a church function with one of the parties in his 
capacity as leader of the church, and had resided for 
two days with the parties during the ceremony. The 
Court of Appeal found that the test for apprehended 
bias was satisfied and declared the decision void. 
Importantly, however, the court stressed that ‘the 
mere attendance of the judge in his role as leader 
of the church at the opening ceremony and his 
participation in formal celebrations would not be 
sufficient to give rise to a reasonable apprehension 
of bias’.
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The second issue is in regard to whether or 
not a judge’s religious beliefs will influence his 
or her decision in a particular case, about which 
there was a variety of opinion. Most judges did not 
consider that it would impact upon their decisions, 
although one reflected that he had never had a case 
involving homosexuality or abortion, but that such 
cases would be testing for someone with his beliefs. 
Only one case has arisen in the past where religious 
beliefs could be said to have had an influence, 
a case involving a charge of witchcraft, and that 
decision was reversed on appeal (Malsoklei v Public 
Prosecutor [2002] VUCA 28).
Sorcery
One judicial informant raised the issue of a fear of 
sorcery, or nakaemas as it is called in Bislama, as 
being a potential threat to judicial independence. 
He recounted an incident whereby he had an incest 
case before him in which the chiefs intervened 
and asked if they could deal with the matter in 
their nakamal (customary court).34 In the course of 
having their request refused, the chiefs indirectly 
threatened the judicial officer and the prosecution 
with nakaemas if they proceeded. In my own 
experiences working in the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office as a legal officer, I also observed occasions 
where prosecutors were afraid to prosecute certain 
cases where the threat of nakaemas existed. Given 
the widespread belief in, and fear of, nakaemas 
even by the most senior government officials (see 
Forsyth 2006), this may therefore be a potential 
source of interference by customary authorities 
wishing to retain control over cases they consider 
fall under their jurisdiction.
Cronyism within the Legal Profession
Cronyism between judges and lawyers is a potential 
factor given the smallness of the legal profession 
in Vanuatu. It was mentioned as a potential threat 
by some informants, but no specific examples 
were given and it does not appear to be significant 
at present.
Mismanagement and Delays of Court Workload
The final potential threat to judicial independence 
is case mismanagement, and delays in cases 
being listed and judgments being delivered, both 
commonly noted by informants. One informant 
noted that this can be a bed for corruption to grow 
in, particularly as lawyers become desperate to 
find some way to make the courts take action with 
regard to their cases. However, there are currently 
active efforts to overcome these problems, in 
particular new case-management procedures being 
implemented,35 which suggests that it is not being 
deliberately used as a cover-up for undue influence.
4. What Factors Account for the Current High 
Levels of Confidence in the Judiciary?
This section discusses the factors that have 
enabled the judiciary to enjoy the current levels 
of confidence in light of the factors that threaten 
it and the relative levels of corruption elsewhere 
in the country. Relevantly, evidence from many 
developing democracies suggests that previous 
confidence in the courts as champions of liberty 
is being revised and less positive accounts are 
surfacing (see Ellett 2013; Hammergren 2007; and 
Popova 2012).
Personal Leadership of the Chief Justice
The most significant factor promoting judicial 
independence in Vanuatu nominated by almost 
every informant in this study was Chief Justice 
Lunabek’s personal leadership.36 The Chief Justice 
is constantly reminding the other judges, the court 
staff, and the magistrates about the importance 
of judicial independence, and the need to remain 
vigilant in preserving it. His personal behaviour 
is also taken as an important role model for 
other members of the judiciary. One magistrate 
commented ‘The Chief Justice has tried his best 
to maintain the integrity of the court by the way 
he conducts himself. Looking at him helps us to 
also conduct ourselves in a way that the integrity 
of the court is maintained.’ The Chief Justice also 
lectures politicians about the importance of judicial 
independence at the official opening of the court 
each year, when he has their full attention as they 
are seated publicly in rows before him (Lunabek 
2014). His attitude was stated by one informant to 
be ‘a barrier to corruption’.
The Chief Justice himself explains his 
commitment to judicial independence by reference 
to his personal history in the court. He commenced 
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in the court as a clerk of the Magistrates Court 
in 1991 and the next year was appointed as 
a magistrate. After a period of international 
postgraduate education he was appointed Senior 
Magistrate in 1995. In 1996 he was appointed to 
the Supreme Court. It was in that year that Chief 
Justice d’Imecourt was deported, as referred to 
above. The current Chief Justice was served with 
an order prohibiting him from seeing Justice 
d’Imecourt, who was taken to the airport. Chief 
Justice Lunabek explained:
That was the factor that convinced me to 
do all the things I did to ensure judicial 
independence. I was a child in the court and 
I saw what happened. I knew when I was 
educated in Commonwealth countries the 
values were the same as in Vanuatu and so it 
shouldn’t have been able to happen the way 
that it did. This is when I started to lobby and 
to search for a model to ensure institutional 
judicial independence. I had my network 
with the judiciary, I had the support of 
fellow judges, especially the federal court of 
Australia. I as a person started to have a close 
relationship with members of the federal 
court, I got into their institutions and saw 
how they worked. I was looking for models 
and I found one in South Australia led by 
Chief Justice Doll who advanced judicial 
independence in its extreme form.37
Chief Justice Lunabek also observed that he has 
come to the conclusion that to be a chief justice in 
a small jurisdiction it is essential to be committed 
to the principle of judicial independence. He 
stated, ‘the only hope for the people is that they 
can rely on the judiciary. This means an everyday 
commitment for the judiciary. You need to watch, 
need to ensure the integrity of the judicial system 
on a daily basis.’ By all accounts, he has been 
extremely successful in executing these beliefs, 
and time and again informants reiterated the 
importance of his leadership. One judge stated, 
‘we all live under his aura in that sense’. This 
achievement is particularly impressive given the 
history of the court he took over, meaning that 
in the words of one informant, when he came 
in he had to ‘re-establish people’s confidence in 
the judiciary’.
The Chief Justice’s commitment to independ-
ence is shared by other Supreme Court judges, who 
are also extremely careful with whom they socialise, 
a fact recognised by many non-judicial informants. 
One judge stated ‘They see our independence, 
they read about it and hear about it and we live it. 
We choose our friends, our kava drinking mates 
carefully. We keep it closed shop. Even on social 
occasions we keep to ourselves.’ In a country as 
small as Vanuatu this means an extremely restricted 
social life, another factor that discourages potential 
judges from applying for the role.
Judicial Networks
Two types of judicial networks are relevant to 
preserving judicial independence: internal (or 
national) and international ones. In terms of 
internal judicial networks, the Supreme Court 
judges have informal lunches together each Tuesday, 
which is an opportunity for them to discuss any 
difficult issues that have come up, including 
challenges to judicial independence. This was 
highlighted as an important support system. It also 
gives the Chief Justice the opportunity to reinforce 
the importance of the ‘ten commandments’ of 
judicial ethics that he has developed.38 Each 
quarter, there are also judicial training days when 
judges and magistrates all come together. Since the 
burning of the court house, these are now the only 
opportunities for the magistrates to mix with the 
judiciary. A number of informants noted the need 
to further strengthen the informal ties between 
judges and magistrates. Although the magistrates 
also have their own informal support network, this 
appears an area that needs further strengthening. It 
is potentially critical as many magistrates enter the 
court at a very junior level, some straight from law 
school, and therefore require considerable guidance 
and support from senior colleagues.
International judicial networks were also 
indicated by the majority of informants as being 
of central importance to the preservation of 
judicial independence and the building of a strong 
jurisprudence. Vanuatu has regular Court of Appeal 
judges from Australia and New Zealand, and at 
times also from Fiji, Solomon Islands and Papua 
New Guinea. These judges play a crucial role in 
putting pressure on the court to maintain high 
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standards of judicial integrity, and their position 
as outsiders exerts at times a necessary additional 
impartiality that can be of use in such small 
jurisdictions. This occurs both through the delivery 
of appeal judgments and informally as they discuss 
the matters afterwards with the judges involved. 
In recent years a habit has formed whereby as 
many Supreme Court judges as possible sit on the 
Court of Appeal benches, and it has been reflected 
that this is an excellent learning opportunity for 
them and also the lawyers involved. It would be 
perhaps valuable to explore whether a similar type 
of procedure may be created for magistrates with 
regard to the Supreme Court. However, it should be 
noted that as magistrates do not have the same rank 
as judges, involving them in such a procedure may 
be considerably more original and complicated, 
although a related precedent does exist in relation 
to assessors sitting on the Supreme Court.39
A final point in regard to this type of support 
is that in a post-colonial context there is the clear 
potential for external judges to erode, rather than 
to support, local confidence in the judiciary. For 
example, it could lead to the perception that such 
visits are necessary in order to monitor or oversee 
the local bench. Fortunately, in recent years at 
least, the particular individuals who have been 
involved in this capacity have participated in a 
positive manner and have often committed to long-
term relationships with the court. Once again this 
demonstrates the critical importance of individuals 
in this field.
Another type of judicial support network is 
the relationships between judges in the region. 
In this respect, the Pacific Judicial Development 
Programme run through the Australian Federal 
Court, and the Australian Federal Court itself, 
have been of considerable importance in 
providing support to the Chief Justice and the 
court in general. This is done formally through 
technical assistance (for example, regarding case 
management), the provision of temporary judges, 
and training programs and opportunities. More 
than this, however, considerable support is gained 
through personal friendships and relationships 
that have been created between the members 
of the judiciary around the region. This in turn 
creates a feeling of comradeship and belonging 
to an international judicial society on the basis 
of commitment to a shared system of values and 
principles. Although intangible, such support is 
critical for what can otherwise be an extremely 
isolated position, particularly for the Chief Justice 
but also for other members of the judiciary.
Respect and Relationship with the Population
In general there is a mutual respect between the 
local bar and the judiciary. The main problem with 
the judiciary from the local lawyer’s perspective is 
tardiness of judgments, not lack of independence. 
The respect of the bar is central to the popular 
perception of the courts, as the way that members 
of the bar discuss the judges influences how 
their clients regard the judiciary. One way this 
relationship is fostered is through ad hoc judicial 
conferences organised by the court that aim to 
provide an open forum whereby the judiciary 
and the lawyers can freely discuss matters of joint 
concern. While one informant was concerned 
that these may diminish the necessary separation 
between the bench and the bar, others cited these 
as beneficial opportunities to ask questions and 
provide feedback.
The respect of the population for the court 
was also cited as an important factor in support-
ing judicial independence. One magistrate stated 
‘When you walk in the streets and go back to the 
community the people look at you and give you the 
greatest respect, so that also helps you respect your-
self and conduct yourself … to give loyalty to the 
institution of the courts.’ This respect is created by 
a number of factors. Aside from the reputation of 
the court, another factor is the fear of public sham-
ing. Several informants stated that people are afraid 
to try to bribe the judiciary as they know it will not 
be accepted and that any attempt to do so will be 
brought to the public’s attention, as happened in the 
case involving the Chief Justice and the politician 
discussed above. The highly Christian nature of the 
society also plays a role; the Protestant churches 
tend to teach that government, as such, is in place 
by God’s will, an attitude which must imbue judicial 
robes with some added gravitas. Another factor is 
the wearing of wigs and gowns by members of the 
judiciary, which is said to assist in providing sepa-
ration between judges and the general population. 
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Although these are foreign imports, ni-Vanuatu 
society respects people of stature, and wigs and 
gowns help to create such stature. They also con-
tribute to the ritual of the court processes, which 
also resonate with the linkages between authority 
and ritual in traditional practices in Vanuatu.
This last point raises an interesting question 
concerning the role that ni-Vanuatu culture 
plays in supporting or undermining judicial 
independence. The notion of judicial independence 
is undoubtedly foreign and was imported into 
Vanuatu through colonialism. In kastom, as 
noted above, the chief is part of the community 
and it is expected that his understandings about 
the political, economic and social imperatives 
for his community as a whole will influence his 
decision. However, many informants identified 
culture as an important factor supporting judicial 
independence, explaining that traditionally people 
respect leadership; for example, they respect chiefs, 
so by tradition people respect authority. There 
is also another possible interpretation I wish to 
suggest, while acknowledging that it is purely 
speculative. This is that in some parts of Vanuatu 
leaders achieved status through the performance of 
a series of rituals that gave them access to higher 
and higher rank. As the men obtain higher rank 
they gradually withdraw from society, even to the 
extent of only eating from the fire designated for 
the men of that particular rank, their tambu faea 
[sacred fire] (Deacon 1934; Leggatt 1906; Sebbelov 
1913). This withdrawal from society correlates 
with the leader’s acquiring or gaining access to 
spiritual powers, which can be utilised ‘in their 
attempts to control the political aspirations of those 
beneath them’ (Allen 1981:24). My hypothesis is 
that this traditional practice of the most powerful 
men withdrawing from society in order to obtain 
powers to regulate that society resonates with the 
way in which judges distance themselves from 
society. It is perhaps relevant that the Chief Justice 
is from the Big Nambas area of Malekula where 
this practice was the most pronounced. Perhaps for 
these reasons, and perhaps for others that still need 
to be identified, it appears that in Vanuatu today 
judicial independence has been able to be mapped 
onto existing respect and authority for chiefs 
and kastom.
Conclusion
The main conclusion of this paper is that there is a 
high degree of confidence by the executive and the 
legal profession in the top two layers of Vanuatu’s 
court system. This confidence, which is related to, 
but broader than just independence, is an important 
factor in maintaining the country’s political stability 
and the rule of law, and in underpinning its ability 
to attract foreign investors and tourists, on whom 
the economy depends. Of course, there is also 
an element of chicken and egg in this situation: 
Vanuatu’s relative political stability also supports 
judicial independence, in contrast to the stresses 
imposed on it by more unstable countries in the 
region such as Papua New Guinea. This raises the 
issue of how robust and resilient the current levels 
of independence are, and whether they would be 
maintained in far more threatening circumstances, a 
question that needs further consideration over time.
The high levels of judicial independence and 
confidence in the institution are not a result of tight 
institutional regulation, but are rather largely due 
to self-regulation that comes from the personal 
integrity and convictions of judiciary and court 
house staff, many of whom have given decades 
of service. The leadership of the current Chief 
Justice—with his vocal and repeated references 
to the importance of judicial independence—
appears to be the central factor in contributing 
to this current environment. While this reliance 
upon self-regulation has served the court well to 
date, there are also risks going forward if the same 
levels of personal integrity in the members of the 
judiciary are not present. In these circumstances, 
the development of complementary mechanisms, 
such as the new complaints procedure discussed 
above, and a Code of Conduct as recommended in 
Transparency International (Vanuatu)’s report, is of 
importance (Jowitt 2014).
The main threats to judicial independence 
differ depending upon the level of judiciary that is 
under consideration. In regard to the Magistrates 
Court, the major threats are economic influence 
and the undue influence of wantokism and family. 
These threats could be better countered by housing 
the magistrates together with the Supreme Court 
judges and developing further opportunities for the 
judges to act as role models and mentors for their 
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junior colleagues. In regard to the Supreme Court, 
the biggest threats come from the control over the 
court budget by the government of the day. The 
influence of the Australian aid program is also one 
that will need to continue to be transparent and at 
arms length. The remuneration of the judiciary and 
their workload is a factor that cuts across all levels 
of the court system and carries with it significant 
consequences for the quality of the judiciary, 
an issue that is likely to become more pressing 
as current members of the judiciary retire and 
replacements with the same levels of commitment 
and integrity are required. The government should 
therefore be encouraged to set more realistic 
benchmarks for judicial remuneration.
This discussion of judicial independence in 
Vanuatu also gives rise to a number of broader 
reflections about judicial independence generally. 
First, the reputation and history (both short and 
long term) of an institution such as a court can 
have a powerful norm-generating influence, and 
in and of itself should be considered an important 
source of regulation. In the context of Vanuatu, 
the court’s reputation creates an environment 
whereby attempts at corruption are discouraged, 
which is perhaps even more effective than any 
formal complaints mechanism may be. Associated 
with this point is the critical influence that a single 
individual, such as the current Vanuatu Chief 
Justice, can play in creating such a history and 
reputation. This also raises the point that succession 
planning is essential to ensuring the continuation 
of such an influence, although fortunately the Chief 
Justice is currently far off retirement age. Second, 
the interaction between cultural practices and 
introduced concepts such as judicial independence 
may not play out in easily predicted ways. In the 
case of Vanuatu, for the present, traditional cultural 
practices of respect for authority have been able to 
be successfully channelled into respect for judicial 
independence. Third, this discussion has shown 
that smallness of jurisdiction is not a necessary 
limit on judicial independence, and in some 
respects it can increase it as it makes instances of 
its breach more visible. Finally, it is clear that for 
such small and relatively isolated jurisdictions, the 
formal and informal support of external judicial 
networks can play an important moral as well as 
practical role. Donors should be encouraged to 
continue supporting such networks.
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Endnotes
1 The problem is regularly commented upon in 
newspapers, local communities and anti-corruption 
non-government organisations such as Transparency 
International. See, for example, Makin (16/1/2015); 
YACV (n.d.); Transparency Vanuatu website; and The 
Heritage Foundation (2015).
2 For example, only 18 months after the 2012 elections 
there had already been three changes of prime 
minister. See further McLeod and Morgan (2007) and 
Jowitt (2014):69–70.
3 For a summary of the history of no confidence 
motions in Vanuatu since independence, see 
Transparency International Vanuatu (18/6/2015).
4 For a detailed description of the relationship between 
the state and the customary justice systems in 
Vanuatu, see Forsyth (2009).
5 Kava is a local drink made with the roots of the kava 
plant, a variety of pepper. It is not fermented but 
contains both sedative and anaesthetic properties, 
producing a relaxing but not intoxicating effect. It is 
a fundamental part of ni-Vanuatu culture and today 
nakamals (places where people drink kava) are an 
important part of Port Vila legal and political culture.
6 Section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Vanuatu actually invests the executive power in the 
Prime Minister and ‘Executive Council’ (cabinet), 
not the President. Rather than a substitute for the 
Crown, the President’s role is more clearly symbolic 
than in most Westminster-based systems (s.33). So 
the separation is more between the executive and 
legislative arms on the one hand and the judicial arm 
on the other.
7 There was a judge based in Luganville, Santo, the 
other main urban centre, but he was relocated to Port 
Vila in 2014.
8 There are two in Santo, one in Malekula and one in 
Tanna.
9 The informants comprised the Chief Justice, two 
other Supreme Court judges, the Chief Registrar, 
three members of the local bar, a magistrate, two 
officers at the Transparency International (Vanuatu) 
office, a former ombudsman, the Director General 
of Justice, and a long-time journalist. I was also able 
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to present my preliminary findings at a seminar at 
the Vanuatu campus of the University of the South 
Pacific where the law school is housed and I obtained 
valuable feedback from legal academics and others.
10 This evaluates key ‘pillars’ in a country’s governance 
system, both in terms of their internal corruption 
risks and their contribution to fighting corruption in 
society at large.
11 These structural elements are extensively detailed in 
Jowitt (2014) and Lunabek (2010).
12 Judicial Services and Courts Act 2000, section 2; 
Article 47(2) Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu.
13 Research was not conducted into the extent to which 
this plan is operational and being implemented, and 
this is an area where further investigation is required.
14 It should be noted, however, that there has been some 
turnover of officers in this office prior to the research.
15 See, for example, the comments about the magistrate’s 
behaviour in Tula v Mofreser [2010] VUSC 76.
16 The permanent court house was burnt by arsonists 
in 2007 and the court has been without a proper 
court building ever since, being housed in a variety of 
temporary locations.
17 See also USDS (2013), which found that ‘The 
constitution provides for an independent judiciary, 
and the government generally respected judicial 
independence in practice.’ The Pacific Judicial 
Development Programme found in a 2012 report 
that ‘the judiciary and institution [of the courts] is 
regarded highly as fair, independent and of integrity’ 
(Ehmann 2012:64).
18 As recently as 21 November 2014 the government 
lodged a motion against the Leader of the Opposition 
alleging that he had paid 14.2 million vatu into the 
accounts of various MPs in order to bring them to the 
opposition’s side (Makin 21/11/2014).
19 Some informants also made comments about this.
20 Interview with Director General of Justice, Port Vila, 
Vanuatu, 9 October 2014.
21 These were Chief Justice Frederick Cooke and Chief 
Justice Vaudin d’Imecourt.
22 Several written reports were compiled about Chief 
Justice d’Imecourt, one by Robert Kent when he 
was serving as a judge and one by the Judicial 
Service Commission. These are referred to in the 
judgment d’Imecourt v The President [1998] VUSC 59 
(PacLII n.d.).
23 Some of the details behind the deportation are 
discussed in In re Civil Contempt of Court, de 
Robillard [1997] VUCA 1, and d’Imecourt v The 
President [1998] VUSC 59.
24 He is now sitting on the Vanuatu Supreme Court.
25 Interview with Chief Registrar, Vanuatu, October 
2014.
26 See the Custom Land Management Act 2013.
27 Interview with Chief Justice, Vanuatu, October 2014.
28 Interview with Director General of Justice, Vanuatu, 
October 2014.
29 The claim was that ‘the overall impression that one 
gets from the evidence is that there were political 
matters in the background’. But this was rejected in 
Public Service Commission v Isom [2010] VUCA 9.
30 See, for example, Carcasses v Boedoro [2014] 
VUSC 155; Carcasses v Boedoro [2014] VUSC 113; 
Vanuaroroa v Republic of Vanuatu [2013] VUSC 102; 
Natapei v Wells [2013] VUSC 43.
31 Judges salaries are set out in schedule 1 to the Judicial 
Services and Courts Act 2000.
32 A newspaper report in 2009 states ‘The AFP 
resurrected the charges, alleging Mr Moti bribed the 
Vanuatu magistrate who dismissed the charges by 
paying him to study in Sydney and offering him a job. 
In an interview with The Australian in February 2007, 
Mr Moti admitted his Port Vila law firm had offered 
the magistrate a job and paid for him to study in 
Sydney “without my knowledge” ’ (McKenna and Elks 
16/12/2009).
33 Interview with Chief Justice, Vanuatu, October 2014.
34 The transfer of cases between the state and kastom 
systems is discussed in Forsyth (2009).
35 Federal Court of Australia (n.d.); Vanuatu Court 
Improvement Plan 2012–2015.
36 This vision is elaborated in his 2014 speech at the 
opening of the court (Lunabek 2014).
37 Interview with Chief Justice, Vanuatu, October 2014.
38 Said to be a mixture of judicial codes of ethics from 
elsewhere and the Chief Justice’s own ideas.
39 Article 51 of the constitution allows parliament to 
appoint as assessors people ‘knowledgeable in custom’ 
to sit on the higher courts. Pursuant to this, Part VIII 
of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 136) provided 
for assessors to sit in the Supreme and Magistrates’ 
courts alongside the judiciary to assist in their 
determination of the guilt of the accused. Assessors 
were formally abolished by the Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Act 1989.
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm16                                                                                                                          State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Miranda Forsyth
References
ABC News 10/5/2012. AFP Thrown out of Vanuatu.
Allen, M. 1981. Rethinking Old Problems: Matriliny, 
Secret Societies and Political Evolution. In M. Allen 
(ed.). Vanuatu: Politics, Economics and Ritual in 
Island Melanesia. Sydney: Academic Press, 9–34.
Binihi, R. 16/6/2015, Opposition Fears Gov’t Will 
Interfere In Judiciary. Vanuatu Daily Post, 1.
Blackwell, E. 13/3/2012. PNG Court Drops Chief Justice 
Case. Sydney Morning Herald (online).
Brigg, M. 2009. Wantokism and State Building in the 
Solomon Islands: A Response to Fukuyama. Pacific 
Economic Bulletin 24(3):148–61.
Deacon, A.B. 1934. Malekula: A Vanishing People in 
the New Hebrides. C. Wedgewood (ed.). London: 
George Routledge and Sons, 346–48.
DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) 
2011. Stretem Rod Blong Jastis: Vanuatu Law and 
Partnership Design Document. Canberra: DFAT.
Ehmann, J. 2012. PJDP Phase 2: Judicial Administration 
Diagnostic Project Regional Registry Systems and 
Processes Report February 2012. Australia: Pacific 
Judicial Development Programme.
Ellett, R. 2013. Pathways to Judicial Power in Transitional 
States: Perspectives from African Courts. London: 
Routledge.
Evans, D., M. Goddard and D. Paterson 2010. The 
Hybrid Courts of Melanesia: A Comparative Analysis 
of the Village Courts of Papua New Guinea, Island 
Courts of Vanuatu and Local Courts of Solomon 
Islands. Justice and Development Working Paper Series 
No. 13. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Federal Court of Australia n.d. International Programs: 
Activities in Vanuatu.
Forsyth, M. 2006. Sorcery and the Criminal Law in 
Vanuatu. LAWASIA 1–27.
Forsyth, M. 2009. A Bird that Flies with Two Wings: State 
and Kastom Justice Systems in Vanuatu. Canberra: 
ANU E Press.
Gould, E. 6/4/2010. New Zealand Judge, Family Receive 
Death Threats in Vanuatu. Impunity Watch Law 
Journal at Syracuse University College of Law.
Hammergren, L.A. 2007. Envisioning Reform: Improving 
Judicial Performance in Latin America. College Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press.
Helmke, G. 2005. Courts under Constraints: Judges, 
Generals, and Presidents in Argentina. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Jowitt, A. 1999. Island Courts in Vanuatu. Journal of 
South Pacific Law 3.
Jowitt, A. 2014. National Integrity System Assessment 
Vanuatu. Vanuatu: Transparency International 
Vanuatu.
Kapiszewski, D. 2012. High Courts and Economic 
Governance in Argentina and Brazil. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Leggatt, W. 1906. Malekulan Images. Science of Man 
8(1):6–8.
Lunabek, V. Chief Justice 2010. Institutional Judicial 
Independence — Differing Models of Judicial 
Independence in the Pacific: Vanuatu Experience. 
Paper presented at the 19th Pacific Regional Judicial 
Conference, 7–10 November, Tumon, Guam (copy on 
file with author).
Lunabek, V. Chief Justice 2014. Speech: 2014 Official 
Opening of the Courts of Vanuatu. Pacific Islands 
Legal Information Institute (PacLII) website.
Makin, B. 21/11/2014. Natuman Gov’t Lodges Motion. 
Vanuatu Daily Digest.
Makin, B. 16/1/2015. Leadership Code Ignored. Vanuatu 
Daily Digest.
Makin, B. 13/6/2015. Bribery Charges Adjournment. 
Vanuatu Daily Digest.
McDonnell, S. 2013. Exploring the Cultural Power of 
Land Law in Vanuatu: Law as a Performance That 
Creates Meaning and Identities. Intersections: Gender 
and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific 33.
McKenna, M. and S. Elks 16/12/2009. Moti Case Thrown 
out as Judge Slams AFP over Witness Payments. The 
Australian.
McLeod, A. and M. Morgan 2007. An Incomplete Arc: 
Analyzing the Potential for Violent Conflict in the 
Republic of Vanuatu. Pacific Affairs 80(1):67–86.
News.com.au 17/6/2014. Papua New Guinea Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill Pursued by Australian 
Investigators and Judge.
PacLII (Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute) n.d. 
PacLII Databases.
Popova, M. 2012. Politicized Justice in Emerging 
Democracies: A Study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Radio New Zealand 17/5/2005. Vanuatu TI Concerned 
about Lack of Public Prosecution.
Sebbelov, G. 1913. The Social Position of Men and 
Women among the Natives of East Malekula, New 
Hebrides. American Anthropologist 15(2):273–80.
ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 17 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2015/9
Staton, J.K. 2010. Judicial Power and Strategic 
Communication in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
The Heritage Foundation 2015. 2015 Index of Economic 
Freedom: Vanuatu.
Thomas, H. 25/5/2011. The ‘Spy’ Who Came in from 
the Heat Ari Jenshel Denies Vanuatu Claims. The 
Australian.
Transparency International 2013. Global Corruption 
Barometer 2013. Berlin: Transparency International.
Transparency International n.d. Global Corruption 
Barometer 2013: Vanuatu.
Transparency International Vanuatu 18/6/2015. 
Vanuatu’s History of No Confidence Motions against 
Prime Ministers since 1980. tivnews: A Transparency 
International Vanuatu Weblog.
Transparency Vanuatu 2013. Vanuatu Judicial 
Monitoring System Research Project, Backlog of 
Cases Report, August 2013. Report prepared by 
Transparency Vanuatu’s Advocacy and Legal Advice 
Centre.
Transparency Vanuatu 7/2/2014. Press Statement.
USDS (United States Department of State, Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor) 2013. 
Vanuatu 2013 Human Rights Report. Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013. USDS.
Vanuatu Daily Post 24/2/2014. Public Confidence in the 
Judiciary?
YACV (Youth Against Corruption Vanuatu) n.d. 
Facebook.
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm18                                                                                                                          State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
For a complete listing of SSGM Discussion Papers, see the SSGM website
2012/1 Tobias Haque, The Influence of Culture on Economic 
Development in Solomon Islands
2012/2 Richard Eves, Christianity, Masculinity and Gender-
Based Violence in Papua New Guinea
2012/3 Miranda Forsyth, Tales of Intellectual Property in the 
South Pacific
2012/4 Sue Ingram, Building the Wrong Peace: Re-viewing 
the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor Through a Political Settlement Lens
2012/5 Henry Tadap Okole, A Critical Review of Papua New 
Guinea’s Organic Law on the Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates: 2001–2010
2012/6 Patrick Vakaoti, Mapping the Landscape of Young 
People’s Participation in Fiji
2012/7 Jane Anderson, ‘Life in All Its Fullness’: Translating 
Gender in the Papua New Guinea Church 
Partnership Program
2012/8 Michael Leach, James Scambary, Mattthew Clarke, 
Simon Feeny and Heather Wallace, Attitudes to 
National Identity Among Tertiary Students in 
Melanesia and Timor Leste: A Comparative Analysis
2012/9 Sarah Logan, Rausim!: Digital Politics in Papua New 
Guinea
2012/10 Nicholas Coppel, Transition of the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
2013/1 David Chappell, Recent Challenges to Nation-
Building in Kanaky New Caledonia
2013/2 Simon Feeny, Lachlan McDonald, May Miller-
Dawkins, Jaclyn Donahue and Alberto Posso, 
Household Vulnerability and Resilience to Shocks: 
Findings from Solomon Islands and Vanuatu
2013/3 Debra McDougall, Spiritual Capacity? Overseas 
Religious Missions in RAMSI-era Solomon Islands
2013/4 Rochelle Bailey, Ni-Vanuatu in the Recognised 
Seasonal Employer Scheme: Impacts at Home 
and Away
2013/5 Satish Chand, Building Peace in Bougainville: 
Measuring Recovery Post-Conflict
2013/6 Stewart Firth, Political Status and Development: The 
Implications for Australian Foreign Policy Towards 
the Pacific Islands
2013/7 Marianne Pedersen, Conservation Complexities: 
Conservationists’ and Local Landowners’ Different 
Perceptions of Development and Conservation in 
Sandaun Province, Papua New Guinea
2013/8 Brij V. Lal, The Strange Career of Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama’s 2006 Fiji Coup
2013/9 Joseph Ketan, Political Governance and Service 
Delivery in Western Highlands Province, Papua New 
Guinea
2013/10 Tobias A. Haque, Economic Transition in Solomon 
Islands
2014/1 Richard Eves, Nicole Haley, R.J. May, Philip Gibbs, 
John Cox, Francesca Merlan and Alan Rumsey, 
Purging Parliament: A New Christian Politics in 
Papua New Guinea?
2014/2 Louise Vella, Translating Transitional Justice: 
The Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission
2014/3 Diana Glazebrook, Papua New Guinea’s Refugee Track 
Record and Its Obligations under the 2013 Regional 
Resettlement Arrangement with Australia
2014/4 Denise Fisher, Tjibaou’s Kanak: Ethnic Identity as 
New Caledonia Prepares its Future
2014/5 Sue Ingram, Political Settlements: The History of an 
Idea in Policy and Theory
2014/6 Romitesh Kant and Eroni Rakuita, Public 
Participation & Constitution-Making in Fiji: A 
Critique of the 2012 Constitution-Making Process
2014/7 Jenny Munro, Papuan Perspectives on Family 
Planning, Fertility and Birth Control
2014/8 Gordon Peake, Lia Kent, Andrey Damaledo & Pyone 
Myat Thu, Influences and Echoes of Indonesia in 
Timor-Leste
2014/9 Guy Powles, The Tongan Monarchy and the 
Constitution: Political Reform in a Traditional 
Context
2014/10 Priya Chattier, Measuring Poverty as if Gender 
Matters: Perspectives from Fieldwork in Fiji
2015/1 Lia Kent, Remembering the Past, Shaping the Future: 
Memory Frictions and Nation-Making in Timor-Leste
2015/2 Tim Sharp, John Cox, Ceridwen Spark, Stephanie 
Lusby and Michelle Rooney, The Formal, the 
Informal, and the Precarious: Making a Living in 
Urban Papua New Guinea
2015/3 Greg Fry, Recapturing the Spirit of 1971: Towards a 
New Regional Political Settlement in the Pacific
2015/4 Julien Barbara, John Cox and Michael Leach, The 
Emergent Middle Classes in Timor-Leste  
and Melanesia: Conceptual Issues and Developmental 
Significance
2015/5 Stephanie Lawson and Elizabeth Hagan Lawson, 
Chiefly Leadership in Fiji: Past, Present, and Future
2015/6 Graham Baines, Solomon Islands Is Unprepared to 
Manage a Minerals-Based Economy
2015/7 Richard Eves and Miranda Forsyth, Developing 
Insecurity: Sorcery, Witchcraft and Melanesian 
Economic Development
SSGM Discussion Paper series 2012–2015
ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 19 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2015/9
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm
ISSN: 1328-7854
ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au
The State, Society & Governance in Melanesia Program (SSGM) is a leading centre for 
multidisciplinary research on contemporary Melanesia and Timor-Leste. SSGM represents 
the most significant concentration of scholars conducting applied policy-relevant research 
and advancing analysis on social change, governance, development, politics, and state–
society relations in Melanesia, Timor-Leste, and the wider Pacific.
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
The Australian National University
Acton  ACT  2601
Telephone: +61 2 6125 3825
Fax: +61 2 6125 9604
Email: ssgm@anu.edu.au
URL: ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au
Twitter: @anussgm
Submission of papers
Authors should follow the Editorial Guidelines, available from the SSGM website.
All papers are peer reviewed unless otherwise stated.
The State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program acknowledges the generous support 
from the Australian Government for the production of this Discussion Paper.
The views, findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the SSGM Program. The Government of Australia, as represented 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), does not guarantee, and accepts no legal 
liability whatsoever arising from or connected to, the accuracy, reliability, currency or completeness 
of any information herein. This publication, which may include the views or recommendations of third 
parties, has been created independently of DFAT and is not intended to be nor should it be viewed as 
reflecting the views of DFAT, or indicative of its commitment to a particular course(s) of action.
